


LITERATURE



AND

PSYCHOLOGY

VOLUME XI

NUMBER 1

WINTER 1961

Les . . . médecins . . . diagnostiquèrent la neurasthénie.

Unité morbide mal dégagée! . . . Entité nosologique insuffisamment définie, par là même insaisissable . . . véritable Protée pathologique qui, comme le Vieillard des Mers, se transforme sans cesse sous l'étreinte du praticien et revêt les figures les plus bizarres et le plus terrifiantes; tour à tour vautour de l'ulcère stomacal ou serpent de la néphrite, soudain elle dresse la face jaune de l'ivresse, montre les pommettes rouges de la tuberculose ou crispe des mains d'étrangleuse qui feraient croire qu'elle a hypertrophié le cœur; enfin elle présente le spectre de tous les maux funestes au corps humain, jusqu'à ce que, cédant à l'action médicale et s'avouant vaincue, elle s'enfuit sous sa véritable figure de singe des maladies.

— Anatole France, "La chemise"

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
General Topics 10

MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

Editorial address:

Department of English
Mott Hall, The City College
New York 31, N. Y.

Leonard F. Manheim, Editor
Eleanor B. Manheim, Associate



Literature and Psychology

THE QUARTERLY NEWS LETTER OF GENERAL TOPICS 10 OF THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

LITERATURE & PSYCHOLOGY is published quarterly under the sponsorship of Discussion Group General Topics 10 of the Modern Language Association. The subscription price is \$2.00 per year; foreign postage, 20 cents. Single issues, and back issues when available, are sold at 50 cents each. All contributions, correspondence, and remittances should be addressed to the Editor at 309 Mott Hall, The City College, New York 31, N. Y. Neither The City College, The Modern Language Association, nor any other institution or organization named in any issue is responsible for this publication, financially or otherwise. Copyright 1961 by Eleanor B. and Leonard F. Manheim.

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Announcements, Notes, and Comments . . . 3

Announcements concerning the Temple University Lecture Series on Psychopathology and Related Disciplines and the Fiftieth Anniversary of the New York Psychoanalytic Society; a note by Robert Rogers continuing our series on parallels between psychodynamic patterns in Freud and Plato, and comments on the last MLA meeting and some of the papers read there.

"Prometheus as a Scapegoat," by Robert Rogers. . . . 6

Mr. Rogers, who published "The Beast in Henry James" in Amer Imago (13, 4, 427-54), was moved to send us this study in Aeschylus after reading Miss Wakeman's "Dynamics of the Tragic Catharsis" (IX, 3 & 4, 39-41). Mr. Rogers names as "the two men most responsible for my urge to dabble in applied psychoanalysis" Professors Frederick Wyatt and Austin Warren, both of Michigan, where the author took his undergraduate degree. His graduate work at Columbia recently terminated in a successfully defended dissertation.

"Dream at Thebes," by Morton Kaplan. . . . 12

Mr. Kaplan, now a graduate student at Columbia, received his B. A. with honors in English from The City College, having had the unique distinction of specializing in psychoanalytic literary criticism (under your Editor's guidance). The present paper is derived from his final Honors thesis.

"The Five Fools in A Tale of a Tub," by R. E. Hughes . . . 20

"Jonathan Swift," writes the author, "has many, many times been made to ascend the analyst's couch; he needs to be given credit for his own awareness of mental attitudes, their quixotic variants, and the role they play in determining action." Professor Hughes, chairman of the English Department at Boston College, will be remembered for his study of Browning's "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came" (IX, 2, 18-19).

Book Review. . . . 23

Irving Malin comments on Leslie Fiedler's No! in Thunder.

Other Books Received . . . 23

With the usual comments and promises.

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A special request for bibliographic assistance, a list of off-prints received, and two special listings.

MINUTES OF THE 1960 MEETING

General Topics 10: Literature and Psychology met for the third time, the eleventh time including the meetings of the Conference of previous years, in the Crystal Room of the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, Philadelphia, from 4:45 to 6:00 p. m., December 27, 1960, with William J. Griffin (George Peabody College) in the chair. After a brief business meeting, during which Helmut E. Gerber was elected Chairman for 1961 and Louis Fraiberg Secretary for 1961, the two papers previously published in LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY, X (Autumn 1960) were read: Joseph Schraibman (Princeton University) read his "Dreams in the Novels of Pérez Galdós" and Robert N. Shorter, in the absence of the author, read Elizabeth Phillips' (Wake Forest College) "The Hocus-Pocus of *Lolita*." Louis Fraiberg (Louisiana State University at New Orleans) then led a lively discussion by members of the audience.

Comments on Mr. Schraibman's paper seemed largely directed toward eliciting more extended remarks on the literary effect of the use of dreams in Galdós' works. Mr. Schraibman replied that this was an aspect of the subject on which he is still engaged. Several members of the audience sought further comment from Mr. Schraibman on the decrease in the number of dreams in Galdós' later work and on the extent and significance of Galdós' awareness of the technique of rendering dream material.

With the purpose of diverting the discussion of Miss Phillips' paper from merely attacking or defending Mme. Bonaparte or Nabokov's anti-Freudian bias, Mr. Manheim remarked that we were not concerned with the validity of Mme. Bonaparte's Freudian version of Poe as literary criticism nor with Nabokov's anti-Freudian bias as the major theme in *Lolita*. He suggested that Miss Phillips' analysis, whether strictly correct or not, shed much light on the novel, but that the novel itself would stand or fall on its own artistic merits.

As a partial reply to the apparently implied criticism of the emphasis in Miss Phillips' paper, Mr. Shorter read from a letter by Miss Phillips in which she anticipated objections to her seeming emphasis on the Bonaparte material and even the Freudian machinery. Miss Phillips' defense, in part, follows:

...my whole point is that satires on Hollywood, motels, American education and advertising, teen-age sex, American sexual mores, the 'normal madness' of the U. S., are ironic equivalents of Freudian exaggerations. . . . I think a great many readers aren't clear in their minds about what satire is. It assumes a startling point of view, creates a startling perspective, to shock the reader into an awareness of the startling qualities in the assumptions being satirized. Life in the U. S. was a perfect setting to equate with the Freudian landscape, and I don't think it accidental at all that *Lolita* could not be written until Nabokov came to America. Suddenly he had the material to substitute for the ridiculous in Bonaparte. Further, I will risk saying, it is the sensational in the U. S. milieu that makes it ironic that we think Poe abnormal.

Discussion had to be ended at six, although several people were still signalling for recognition. In all, about 200 persons, including some 80 standees, gathered to make this probably the best-attended meeting in the history of the Literature and Psychology group.

Helmut E. Gerber, Secretary
Purdue University

ANNOUNCEMENTS, NOTES, AND COMMENTS

* * Lecture Series

Under the general direction of Professor James D. Page, the Department of Psychology at Temple University in Philadelphia announces the following Lecture Series for the Spring Semester:

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH

Place and Time: Temple University, Broad and Montgomery Campus;
Room 10-12, Curtis Hall, Fridays, 4:00 to 6:00 p. m.

Feb. 17	On the Nature of Psychopathology	Dr. James D. Page Temple University
Feb. 24	Law and Psychopathology	Dr. Samuel Polsky Temple Law School
Mar. 3	Clinical Psychology and Psychopathology	Dr. Zygmunt A. Piotrowski Jefferson Medical Coll.
Mar. 10	Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology	Dr. O. Spurgeon English Temple Univ. Hospital
Mar. 17	Social Psychiatry and Psychopathology	Dr. Herman Niebuhr, Jr. Temple Univ. School of Medicine
Mar. 24	Psychopharmacology and Psychopathology	Dr. James H. Ewing Univ. of Pennsylvania Hospital
Apr. 7	Psycholinguistics and Psychopathology	Dr. Harry L. Weinberg Temple University
Apr. 14	Philosophy of Science and Psychopathology	Dr. Sidney Axinn Temple University
Apr. 21	Anthropology and Psychopathology	Dr. Anthony Wallace Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute
Apr. 28	Genetics and Psychopathology	Dr. Franz J. Kallmann Columbia University Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons
May 5	Religion, Existentialism, and Psychopathology	Dr. Adrian van Kaam Duquesne University
May 12	Literature and Psychopathology	Dr. Leonard F. Manheim City College of New York
May 19	Neurology and Psychopathology	Dr. Fred A. Mettler Columbia University Coll. of Physicians & Surgeons
May 26	Biology and Psychopathology	Dr. Seymour S. Kety National Inst. of Mental Health, and Johns Hopkins University

Although planned as an advanced course for graduate students in psychology, the lectures are open to interested members of various other professions. It is suggested that guests not registered for the course call Center-6-4000 to insure seat reservation. Ask for Miss Harriet Romm, Psychology Department, or write to her if you are coming from out of town.

* * Fiftieth Anniversary

The New York Psychoanalytic Society, founded by Dr. A. A. Brill in 1911, celebrated its fiftieth anniversary on February 4, 1961. The semi-centennial program included the presentation of papers by such distinguished psychoanalysts as Drs. Bertram D. Lewin, Heinz Hartmann, Lawrence S. Kubie, and Jacob A. Arlow. The press release issued by the Society had the following comment:

Today, the value of psychoanalytic concepts is undisputed. Modern man is beginning to accept the truth about himself — the dynamic power of his unconscious, the importance of early childhood experiences and fantasy life, and the general principle that the mind is subject to natural laws often beyond its control. The vocabulary of analysis has become part of everyday language, used and abused by the general public. Freudian concepts permeate current views on crime and delinquency, education and philosophy. The deepened understanding of man's emotions and motivations has profoundly influenced novelists, playwrights, artists, and critics. . . .

* * Plato and Psychoanalysis

References to Plato seem to crop up from time to time in our pages. Miss Kraus, our then Editorial Assistant, provided an epigraph from Book IX of The Republic for our August 1955 issue; Professor Obler used the Ion as a source for a description of the Romantics' concept of the poet; Professor Wilson submitted a note (X, 1, 2-3) on a parallel between psychoanalytic theory and the concept of the soul of the lover in the Phaedrus. Now Robert Rogers of Douglass College, who is represented elsewhere in this issue by a longer study in Greek literature, raises the question whether "the entire class system of Plato's ideal state" is not "analogous to Freud's conception of the structure of the psyche."

In Book IX of The Republic Socrates endeavors to show that no man who respects the nobility of his soul could prefer injustice to justice by constructing an image of the soul, which is one-third monster, one-third lion, and one-third man. Rather than allowing the monster mastery over the man, which would be injustice, the man must be master:

He should watch over the many-headed monster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities, and preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart his ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts with one another and with himself. (589 - Jowett translation.)

These three parts of the soul correspond, of course, to the evil horse, the noble horse, and the charioteer in the soul of the lover and — again — to the Id, Superego, and Ego.

That this is so will become more clear as certain other parallels are established. In Book IV Socrates discusses what he calls the principles of the soul, which are three: (1) reason; (2) passion or spirit; and (3) appetite or desire or concupiscence. According to Socrates the rational principle ought, with the assistance of the spirit, to rule over the irrational or appetitive one, and at several points he declares that these principles correspond to the classes of the state: the rulers or philosopher-kings; the warriors or auxiliaries; and the common people. It follows, says Socrates, that the three virtues of the entire soul are wisdom, courage, and temperance (temperance corresponding to the restraint which should be exercised over the appetite).

All of these analogies, in emulation of Plato's passion for order, may be tabulated as follows:

Freudian Psyche	Image of the Soul	Principles of the Soul	Three Classes	Virtues of the Soul
Ego	man	reason	rulers	wisdom
Superego	lion	passion (spirit)	warriors	courage
Id	monster	appetite (desire)	commoners	temperance

The two horses and the charioteer might also be easily inserted in the table. To be sure, the resemblance between the metapsy-

chology of Plato and Freud is crude (as Professor Wilson implies). That is to be expected, for it would be a great wonder if the two systems agreed in detail. That there should be any correspondence at all should evoke no surprise if we assume that there exists a degree of universal psychological truth in both systems.

The correlation between the man-monster Ego-Id antinomies seems obvious enough. Less easy to account for is the relationship between the lion and the Superego, and the items in the second line in the above table seem to be the weakest in similarity. Yet just in this area Plato's insight was keenest, for he knew that some other restraining force besides reason must inhere in man, and he intuitively grasped that it (the Superego) must be non-rational, like the Id, in contrast to the Ego, which embodies the reality principle and which develops out of the Archaic Ego of the infant as rudimentary excitation is mastered through exposure to reality. While Plato commonly speaks of reason as the paramount restraining principle, he also clearly demonstrates, using the story of Leontius as an illustration (Book IV), that "anger [passion, spirit] sometimes goes to war with desire" and that passion operates in the service of reason by restraining appetite; that is, that the Superego and the Ego jointly inhibit the instinctual impulses. R. R.

* * * MLA

It seems to be getting harder and harder to attend those MLA groups, sections, and conferences whose programs indicate papers of possible interest to our readers, even more difficult to hear the papers at some of the meetings we do attend. (May we suggest that if it is absolutely necessary to have exhibit booths outside doorless meeting rooms, some care should be exercised to see that the exhibits so placed do not feature recordings with assorted sound effects?) For these reasons among others, therefore, our listing will include a large number of + signs, indicating "hearsay only." Other symbols are those used in our Bibliographies.

+ "Paradise Lost and the Mythological Dimension," by Wayne Shumaker (Period of Milton).

& "Arthur Schnitzler's Typology," by Herbert Lederer (Modern German).

+ "Robert Musil and the Feeling of Emptiness," by Burton Pike (Modern German).

+ "Le Neveu de Rameau: psychanalyse existentielle de Diderot par lui-même," by Jacques Ehrmann (18th Century French).

& "The Two Selves of Sinclair Lewis" (not the paper originally scheduled), by Mark Schorer (Prose Fiction).

% "The Novel and the Mind," by Benjamin T. Sankey, Jr. (Prose Fiction).

&! "Toward a Revised Definition of Romanticism," by Morse Peckham (Wordsworth and His Contemporaries).

+ "Becky Sharp and Napoleon," by Alan M. Hollingsworth (English Section II).

+ "Two Inside Narratives: Billy Budd...and L'Etranger," by Roger Shattuck (Comparative Literature Section).

For a much fresher, less jaded, report on doings at the 1960 Convention, see Kathryn Gibbs Gibbons' "Morality at the MLA," in CEA Critic for February, 1961, pp. 7, 11.

PROMETHEUS AS A SCAPEGOAT

Tears and Disasters, Death and Shame, and all
The ills the world hath names for — all are here.

— Oedipus Rex (Sheppard translation)

Mankind could never do without scapegoats.

— Koestler, Darkness at Noon

Prometheus' theft of fire from heaven, one of the most fascinating stories in all mythology, has received considerable psychoanalytic attention. Among other commentators, Karl Abraham devoted most of his Dreams and Myths ^{/1} to it, and Freud used it as the basis for his 1932 paper, "The Acquisition of Power over Fire." ^{/2} Freud apparently did not consult Abraham's earlier work (1909). An examination of the disparity between their interpretations constitutes a point of departure in the following essay for a further discussion of the myth, especially of Aeschylus' version, and for some speculations on the nature of tragedy.

Abraham develops at length the mythological associations of fire with the libido. Fire was associated with the sun and with lightning. It descended from heaven. The movement of lightning suggested the flight of a bird, so fire was in turn linked with birds, variously the eagle, the hawk, and the woodpecker. There was also the idea of the fire of life, based on the analogy of the body being warm when alive, cold when dead. All Indo-Germanic peoples produced fire by rubbing or twirling a stick in the hollow of another piece of wood; hence there was the important association of fire with coitus, further evidence of this being the fact that the two parts of the primitive fire-making apparatus often bore the names of the male and female genitalia. ^{/3} At a later stage in myth-making there are fire-gods. In the Vedas the god Agni incorporated fire, light, the sun, and lightning. He is also the first man. In some versions he was the lightning-bird. Picus, the woodpecker, was the fire-bird, lightning, and man in the oldest Latin myths, and later the god of lying-in women and of sucklings. ^{/4} Matarichvan, whose name signifies "he who swells or works in the mother," could bring forth Agni when he was hidden in the clouds or the woods or in a cavern.

Matarichvan, the fire-bringer, corresponds in the Greek myth to Prometheus. In historical times the name Prometheus, which has experienced various changes, has been interpreted as 'forethought.' As an older form he is, among other things, referred to as 'Pramantha.' This name has a double meaning. It signifies first the 'forth-rubber,' that is, one who through rubbing brings something forth.

Through rubbing he brings the fire forth and generates man. Here it is to be noted that 'mantha' signifies the male genitals. The second meaning of Pramantha is the

^{1/} Tr. William A. White. New York, 1913.

^{2/} Collected Papers (London, 1950), V, 288-94.

^{3/} See also Sir James George Frazer, Myths of the Origin of Fire (London, 1930), p. 220; Géza Róheim, The Origin and Function of Culture (New York, 1943), p. 99; and Robert Graves, The Greek Myths (Baltimore, 1955), I, 67.

^{4/} Many myths indicate that man obtained fire from a bird; e. g., Frazer reports that "the Menri of the Malay-Peninsula say that the first fire was brought to them by a woodpecker." (Myths of the Origin of Fire, p. 209.)

'fire-robber.' Close to the idea that Prometheus-Pramantha created fire, is the other idea, that he — like Matarichvan — brought or stole the fire from heaven. He concealed the sparks in a shrub, that is, one of the sorts of wood that serve for the creation of fire.

In the myth we thus see fire represented in three different forms: as fire (fire-god), as fire-maker (or rubber, or fetcher) and finally as man. /5

The Sanskrit word pramantha, it might be noted at this point, means the swastika, or fire-drill, which Prometheus was supposed to have invented. /6 Abraham concludes later on that fire appears in a total of four forms in the Prometheus saga: as heavenly fire, as earthly fire, as the fire of life, and as sexual fire. These are some of the details, included by way of background; Abraham's generalizations follow.

He defines myth as "a fragment of the repressed life of the infantile psyche of the race. It contains (in disguised form) the wishes of the childhood of the race." He sees the dream mechanisms of condensation and displacement at work, condensation in the threefold conception of Prometheus' name, displacement in the fact that, qua man, he is censured for "stealing" fire, his godly nature being lost to recollection. Abraham concludes that the Prometheus myth embodies three wishes. First, it contains the wish for a care-taking being. This is Prometheus as forethinker, the bringer of fire and technology to man; but according to Abraham this meaning, analogous to the manifest dream level, is secondary and does not fit the deeper meaning of the saga. Second, the myth reflects — like so many others — man's wish to be of divine origin, which Abraham relates to childish fantasies of being a prince or a king and to pathological delusions of descent in the insane. "Creation," he says, "is nothing but procreation divested of the sexual." And third, at its deepest level, myth is an apotheosis of the human power of generation: "The Prometheus saga, in its oldest form, had the tendency to proclaim the masculine power of procreation as a principle of all life."

Freud's interpretation of the myth departs radically in certain respects from Abraham's. Freud conjectures that in order to possess fire "it was necessary for man to renounce the homosexually-tinged desire to extinguish it by a stream of urine." After mentioning that the art of conserving fire had probably preceded that of kindling it and after citing a Mongolian law against "pissing upon ashes," Freud refers to a footnote in Civilization and Its Discontents in which he had earlier conjectured that

Putting out fire by urinating — which is also introduced in the later fables of Gulliver in Lilliput and Rabelais's Gargantua — therefore represented a sexual act for a man, an enjoyment of masculine potency in homosexual rivalry. Whoever was the first to deny himself this pleasure and spare the fire was able to take it with him and break it in to his own service. /7

Freud regards the hollow fennel stalk in which Prometheus carried the fire as a penis symbol, but he stresses the dual function of the penis, suggesting that fire is symbolically disguised as its opposite (as so often in dreams) and that "It is not fire which man harbours in his penis-tube; on the contrary, it is the means of extinguishing fire, the water of his stream of urine." Another important observation by Freud is that the acquisition of fire is

5/ Abraham, p. 31.

6/ Graves, I, 148. Of the swastika, Jane Harrison reports that "to the Greeks it undoubtedly stood at one time for the Sun." (Themis, Cambridge, England, 1912, p. 525.)

7/ Civilization and Its Discontents, tr. Joan Riviere (London, 1953), pp. 50-51.

always a crime. /8 Since in myth the gods are allowed behavior prohibited to mankind, such as incest, Freud concludes that "the instinctual life, the id, is the god who is defrauded when the gratification of extinguishing fire is renounced," and he adds that "the divinity in the story has nothing of the character of a superego." Mentioning the ancient belief that the liver was the seat of all passions, Freud suggests that the diurnal destruction of Prometheus' liver represents the depletion and renewal of the sexual urge, this also being his interpretation of the phoenix myth (which he discusses in the same paper). He associates fire with Prometheus' liver — for elsewhere in the paper he regards fire as libidinal — and he considers the bird which feeds on the liver to be phallic.

Actually Freud distinguishes two different Prometheus figures: one is phallic and is pictured by man as being punished because of his lust; the other is renunciatory and is conceived as being punished because of "the resentment which the hero of civilization inevitably aroused in an instinct-ridden humanity." It is the latter one that Freud stresses. As compared to Abraham, then, Freud's view of the myth emphasizes the renunciation rather than the celebration of mankind's sexuality; and he discusses several things which Abraham does not cover: the fennel stalk, the punishment, the liver, and the bird.

In attempting a resolution of the conflicting interpretations of Abraham and Freud, three main points will be made: first that Prometheus appears to be a scapegoat figure of some sort; second that the rebellion theme has been inadequately treated; and third that Freud's discussion of the nature of tragedy in *Totem and Taboo* provides the basis for a far more cogent analysis of the myth.

In *The Golden Bough* Frazer expounds at length on the nature and function of scapegoats. /9 The scapegoat was variously an inanimate object, such as a spear, or a vehicle, such as a boat which was sailed away; or else it was a bush, a tree, an animal (a goat, a bull, et cetera), or a man. Often it was a divine animal or a divine man, and — most notably — it was a dying god:

The accumulated misfortunes and sins of the whole people are sometimes laid upon the dying god, who is supposed to bear them away for ever, leaving the people innocent and happy. /10

If Prometheus constitutes a scapegoat figure, like Christ who suffered for the sins of mankind, what crime did Prometheus take upon himself? Obviously that of stealing fire. What does this really signify? At one level, at any rate, it means libidinal fire. But why should this be a crime?

Freud's answer is that Prometheus is a culture-hero who defrauded the instinctual life (the gods) of fire and who is con-

8/ Compare Mauri in the Polynesian quest-for-fire myths: "But in every case [version of the myth], an ancient Hina, living in a volcano, in a cave, or simply in the earth, possesses the treasure, and Mauri obtains it by trickery, cajoling, or violence." (Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, New York, 1948, p. 152.)

9/ *The Golden Bough*, abridged edition (New York, 1951), pp. 616-680 et passim.

10/ According to Frazer, under such names as Osiris, Tammuz, Adonis, and Attis the yearly decay and revival of vegetable life was personified as a god who died and rose again from the dead annually (*Golden Bough*, p. 378). The dying god is related to the various hero figures described by Rank in *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* and to the totem figure in *Totem and Taboo*. For further discussion of the relation of the hero to the dying god, see Jane Harrison's *Themis*.

ceived as being punished by the gods because the preservation of fire involved a painful renunciation of a homosexually-tinged desire to urinate upon hot ashes. While there would appear to be no reason to question the associations between fire and water propounded by Freud, it may be unnecessary to accept his interpretation of the fennel stalk as a water symbol represented by its opposite; another explanation for the motives of the crime and the punishment, without Freud's conflicting analysis of the nature of the crime—with its unwieldy hypothesis of the two Prometheuses, one phallic and one renunciatory—is worth consideration. As for the fennel stalk (without having recourse to the admittedly universal awareness of the dual function of the male organ in connection with this myth), its occurrence in the myth appears to be overdetermined, the stalk being both phallic (shape, hollowness, fire) and at the same time an instrument actually used by primitive people for the purpose of transporting fire.¹¹ And as for regarding Prometheus simply as a culture-hero, it should be pointed out that such an interpretation emphasizes what corresponds to the manifest rather than the latent content of the myth; furthermore, both Abraham and Graves regard this meaning of the myth as a later elaboration of the Greeks.¹²

For a different emphasis on the nature of Prometheus' crime, Aeschylus' version of the myth in Prometheus Bound (Havelock translation) will be examined for what it may yield. This version powerfully dramatizes the conflict between Zeus and Prometheus rather than the theft itself. Their relationship suggests in manifold ways that of father and son.¹³ In the play Zeus is almighty: absolute in his power, terrible in his wrath, and merciless in his retribution. "For who / May flout the rescript and the wrath of Zeus?" muses Hephaestus. On his side, Prometheus is proud and defiant. "Heaven's willful son," Power calls him, and Primal Genesis (Okeanos) tells him that he pays "the wage / Earned by a rash and overweening tongue." Like all Greek tragic heroes, Prometheus is guilty of hubris, and at one level his crime is simply that of rebellion against authority. Yet at the story level no solid reason emerges why fire, "God's proud possession," should be prohibited to Prometheus or to mankind, so that it must necessarily possess some symbolic significance. It is referred to as "the technological flame," that is, flame used to make, to create things, a conception which reinforces the phallic import. Are we to conclude on the basis of Zeus' being a father surrogate that Prometheus stole the paternal sexuality? Such an interpretation, which regards the conflict as Oedipal, seems corroborated by the omnipresence of this theme in mythology: Cronus (born of incest) castrated his father Uranus with a flint sickle, threw the genitals into the sea, and from the blood were born the Erinnyes, who

11/ According to Graves, the Greek islanders still carry fire about from one place to another in the pith of giant fennel stalks. (The Greek Myths, I, 149.)

12/ Abraham, p. 33; Graves, I, 148. Graves concurs about the Greeks' misunderstanding of the meaning of Prometheus' name, explaining that he was confused with the Carian hero Palamedes, who invented all civilized arts, and with the Babylonian god Ea, who created a splendid man from the blood of Kingu. Graves also rejects as not genuinely mythical Hesiod's account of Prometheus, Epimetheus and Pandora, and Hesiod's story of the tricking of Zeus about the sacrifice of the bull.

13/ Both Róheim (Origin and Function of Culture, p. 98) and Theodor Reik (Myth and Guilt, New York, 1957, p. 405) have briefly noted this aspect. See also Helen Huckel, "The Tragic Guilt of Prometheus," American Imago, XII, 4 (Winter 1955), 325-35, whose excellent article was encountered subsequent to the formulation of the present study. Dr. Huckel accepts Freud's paper in its entirety and yet regards the conflict between Prometheus and Zeus as Oedipal.

avenge crimes of parricide and perjury. Zeus, as prophesied, overthrew his father Cronus in turn and is said to have castrated him. If Zeus marries Thetis, he too will be overthrown (which is Prometheus' secret).

Prometheus Bound manifests the common dream phenomenon of splitting or doubling characters in such a way as to lend further support to the idea that the conflict is Oedipal. While Zeus constitutes the bad father, Okeanos appears as the good, the sympathetic father. According to one myth, Okeanos, the stream which girdles the earth, is the father of all things (in the play he is Prometheus' elder brother), and—in another connection—Jane Harrison considers him "an earlier unhumanized Zeus." ¹⁴ Whereas Prometheus appears to be the phallic, rebellious son, Hermes—Zeus' "errand boy"—appears as the passive, loyal son. During the agon between them Prometheus says, "When I compare the wages that you earn/With mine, believe me, I would not exchange!" and Hermes answers, "These rocks perhaps reward your patience better/Than loyal service at the Father's side?"

The chorus, composed of the daughters of Genesis (Okeanids), may be identified with the primal horde, as will be explained in a moment. More complex and mysterious is the role of Io, The Wanderer. Possibly she may be a vaguely defined mother-figure (with Hera, not in the play, corresponding to the bad mother)—an image of the innocent mother defiled and condemned to a life of suffering by the bestial father. Whether this be true or not, Io appears to be another double of Prometheus. Dramatically she functions as a dynamic contrast to Prometheus' stasis (chained immovable); she dances constantly, grotesquely, pursued by the gadfly and tormented by "the thin hot flame of insanity." Psychologically, her crime parallels that of Prometheus, being sexual in nature. She dreams at night of love.

And yet hot shame
Of my corruption still sweeps over me:
My reckless maidenhood's catastrophe
And shape subverted by the God's agency...
It was at night the haunting visions came
Entering my bedchamber, and spoke to me
Caressingly.

Io's metamorphosis into a sacred cow suggests the totem animal, and she is clearly a scapegoat figure, burdened with guilt and condemned to suffer. The oracles advise Io's father to thrust his daughter from home, an "Outcast the corners of the world to roam." Her compulsive wandering may also have sexual significance, just as Fenichel indicates it may have in a child who feels compelled to run away from home: "The danger, as a rule, is represented by depression and feelings of guilt, which the 'wanderer' tries to leave behind him." ¹⁵

The conclusion to be drawn is that the dying-god hero Prometheus functions as a scapegoat for the universal sexual guilt of mankind. Having presumed to steal the sexual fire and thus to supplant the father, he must be punished—and if he is guilty and is punished, then man is innocent and at liberty to indulge himself. The analysis of Greek tragedy which Freud presents in Totem and Taboo bears out this interpretation of the myth much better, it is felt, than his own analysis of the fire myth:

A group of persons, all of the same name and dressed in the same way, surround a single figure upon whose words and actions they are dependent, to represent the chorus and the original single impersonator of the hero. Later developments created a second and a third actor in order

¹⁴/ Harrison, p. 457.

¹⁵/ Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neuroses (New York, 1951), p. 369.

to represent opponents in playing, and off-shoots of the hero, but the character of the hero as well as his relation to the chorus remains unchanged. The hero of the tragedy had to suffer; this is today still the essential content of a tragedy. He had taken upon himself the so-called 'tragic guilt,' which is not always easy to explain; it is often not a guilt in the ordinary sense. Almost always it consisted of a rebellion against a divine or human authority and the chorus accompanied the hero with their sympathies, trying to restrain and warn him, lamented his fate after he had met with what was considered fitting punishment for his daring attempt. /16

The hero had to suffer for his tragic guilt "because he was the primal father, the hero of that primordial tragedy the repetition of which here serves a certain tendency, and the tragic guilt is the guilt which he had to take upon himself in order to free the chorus of theirs." The chorus of Okeanids, then, corresponds to the primal horde, whose guilt Prometheus bears — along with that of the rest of humanity. /17

The two functions of all religious ritual, according to Jane Harrison, are expulsion and impulsion, the elimination of evil and the securing of good. /18 And as numerous scholars attest — Harrison among them — Greek tragedy evolved from religious ritual. The figure of Prometheus as a scapegoat may thus be thought of as being both a ritualistic vehicle for carrying away the evil of sexual guilt and, paradoxically, as the giver of sexual life. Considered in Aristotelian terms, the pity we feel results from our empathy with the sufferings of the tragic hero, while our fear may more precisely be designated as anxiety, stemming from sexual guilt, of which we are symbolically purged by the action of the ritual we behold enacted. Certainly some of the world's great tragedies — Oedipus Rex, Hamlet, The Brothers Karamazov — seem to correspond to this pattern of filial rebellion and sexual guilt. Whether they be so for the same reasons or not, it may be contended that the tragic hero is, at least originally, a scapegoat figure whose death absolves mankind of guilt.

Robert Rogers
Department of English
Douglass College
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, N. J.

16/ Totem and Taboo, in Basic Writings (New York, 1938), p. 926.

17/ The standard anthropological objection to such conceptions as that of the primal horde; that is, the assumption of cultural atavism or a racial unconscious, was satisfactorily resolved by Edward Sapir, who accepted these ideas in their conceptual, theoretical sense but not in any literal, historical sense. (Culture, Language and Personality, Berkeley, Cal., 1956, pp. 148-51.)

18/ Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion (Cambridge, England, 1921), p. 1.

* * Studies in Romanticism

A new quarterly journal bearing this title will begin publication in the fall of 1961, sponsored by the Graduate School of Boston University and with David Bonnell Green as Editor. Manuscripts dealing with any aspect of the Romantic Movement will be welcome, but they must be written in English. Subscriptions at \$4.00 per year may be sent to the Editor at 236 Bay State Road, Boston 15, Massachusetts.

DREAM AT THEBES

In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud characterizes Oedipus in Sophocles' Oedipus Rex as a psychoneurotic. He considers the play comparable to a dream creation. The gradual unfolding of the incestuous and parricidal material he finds similar to the process of psychoanalytic therapy. /1/ Freud attributed the common interpretation which holds Oedipus to be helpless before the will of the gods, to secondary elaboration, reflecting the cultural views of a later time. He did not, however, analyze the play at length, as a literary creation, as he did with other works of fiction and drama. /2/ Subsequent psychoanalysts have not sought to demonstrate that the text of the drama itself necessitates the assumption of incestuous and parricidal motives on the part of Oedipus. /3/ This paper seeks to substantiate the existence of just such motives, considering the play solely in terms of its internal literary coherence.

1. The Delphic Oracles.

Relating the circumstances of his past life, Oedipus toward the end of the play describes his visit to the Delphic oracles and his reaction to their words:

...I went to Delphi; and Phoebus sent me forth disappointed of that knowledge for which I came, but in his response set forth other things, full of sorrow and terror and woe; even that I was fated to defile my mother's bed, and that I should show unto men a brood which they could not endure to behold; and that I should be the slayer of the sire who begat me.

And I, when I had listened to this, turned to flight from the land of Corinth... to some spot where I should never see fulfillment of the infamies foretold in mine evil doom. /4/ (Emphasis mine)

Dealing with the events of the play in chronological order, rather than in the order in which they unfold, this flight from Corinth provides the first indication that Oedipus wishes the prophecy's fulfillment. Consider that Oedipus had first been told by a drunken reveller that he was not the true son of Polybus and Merope. At that time Oedipus was disturbed by this imputation, but was comforted by his foster parents' anger. According to

- 1/ In The Basic Writings (Brill trans.), New York, 1938, pp. 307-309. For Freud's analogy between literary creation and dream-work see "The Relation of the Poet to Day-Dreaming" (1908), Collected Papers (London, 1953), IV, 173-83.
- 2/ As, for instance, his analysis of Ibsen's Rosmersholm in "Some Character-Types met with in Psycho-Analytic Work" (1915), "The Theme of the Three Caskets" (1915), "Dostoevsky and Parricide" (1928), and other writings referred to by Louis Fraiberg in "Freud's Writings on Art" (Int Jrnl Psa, XXXVII, I [1956]; Lit & Psy, VI, 4 (Nov 1956), 116-130; now included as Chapter I in Psychoanalysis and American Literary Criticism [Detroit, 1960]).
- 3/ Mark Kanzer, "The Oedipus Trilogy," Psa Qrtrly, XIX (1950) 561-72; Charles Rado, "Oedipus the King," Psa Rev, 43 (1956), 228-34; Sofie Lazarsfeld, "Did Oedipus Have an Oedipus Complex?" Amer Jrnl Orthopst, 14 (1944), 226-29.
- 4/ Jebb translation in Oates and O'Neill, eds., The Complete Greek Drama (New York, 1938), I, 393-394. All future quotations from the play will be identified by page references to this edition, inserted in the text.

Oedipus' later recollection of this scene, we do not know that they explicitly denied the imputation. But in any case, when the taunt thrown at Oedipus "still crept abroad with strong rumor," Oedipus was now sufficiently affected to journey secretly from his foster parents' city in order to learn the truth at Delphi.

Having heard the Oracles, Oedipus possesses much greater reason to settle the question of his lineage; the need to protect himself against parricide and incest. Yet Oedipus flees from Corinth, the one place where some part of the truth might have been learned. Such behavior cannot be seen as expressive of a wish to avoid disaster. Oedipus journeys from Corinth in order to separate himself from Polybus and Merope as though he had no doubt of their being his true parents, assuming that separation from them must ensure avoidance of parricide and incest. But doubt had sent Oedipus to Delphi in the first place, and that doubt had not been allayed. Hence his expressed motive in fleeing Corinth does not stand up well under closer scrutiny. With a sincere desire to resist the prophecy, Oedipus' most constructive action would have been to impress Polybus and Merope with the now dire necessity of his learning whether they were indeed his parents. Assured that they were, he might then justifiably choose to leave them forever. Finding that they were not his parents, he would at least be strengthened in the knowledge that although separation from them guaranteed no assurance against the fulfillment of the prophecy, it might be of some help in circumventing "the will of the gods." But Oedipus' choice of action, entirely ill-suited to a defense against the Oracles' fulfillment, impels us to look for further evidence that he is in fact motivated by "Oedipal" wishes. It might be said that in the duress of the moment Oedipus chose the less judicious course. But we cannot lightly dismiss the fact that Oedipus behaves in a manner which he might very well know enhanced the possibility of the prophecy's fulfillment. We must rely on further textual evidence for refutation or confirmation of this view, and not take him at his word.

2. The prophecy fulfilled.

If we are to continue in the view that Oedipus has reason to be in doubt as to his identity and the whereabouts of his parents (the text will give further support to this view later), his behavior becomes inexplicable if we are also to believe that he wishes to escape his predicted fate. Oedipus does not hesitate to involve himself in mortal combat with a man of his father's age, nor to marry a woman of his mother's age! Perhaps, it may be argued, Oedipus did have sufficient reason for violence, because of his ill-treatment on the road to Thebes at the hands of Laius and his party. Perhaps, having earned the right to rule at Thebes, we can reasonably accept the possibility that Oedipus would choose to wed the royal and respected Queen. But, after all, we might expect a will to resist fulfillment of the recently-told tale of "sorrow and terror and woe," coupled with his doubts as to his parentage, to have dissuaded from these acts.

Let us imagine that Oedipus had asked a friend, after his trip to Delphi, how he might oppose the fate predicted for him. How simple the answer would have been. Oedipus need only avoid killing an elderly man and marrying a woman much older than himself. On that basis the question of his birth need never be settled. The prophecies could never have been fulfilled. Had Oedipus had no reasons to doubt his origin, we might accept his behavior as inordinately ironic but coincidental in its results. Since the text demonstrates, however, that he did have such doubts, we cannot reconcile his insouciant slaying of a man and marriage to a woman both a generation older than himself with a genuine wish to avoid such dire prophecies.

3. A slip of the tongue.

In order to lift the plague from the city, Oedipus sends Creon to Phoebus. Returning, Creon states that the city cannot be healed until the murder of Laius is avenged. Repeating the words of Phoebus, Creon speaks of a defiled "thing," a word which may refer to the unavenged death or, more probably, to the individual responsible. Creon then refers to the needed banishment of "a man." Oedipus follows this lead by further questioning about a single murderer. Now, however, Creon recounts his knowledge of the circumstances of Laius' death, and slips into the plural, referring to "robbers . . . , not in one man's might, but with full many hands" (p. 372). Creon may be tapping his memory for the details as he had received them at the time, or he may be faithfully recounting an incorrect statement by the Oracle concerning a plurality of murderers when he says: ". . . the god now bids us plainly to wreak vengeance on his murderers—whosoever they may be" (p. 372). In either case, Creon continues in this manner and speaks explicitly of the many robbers who fell on Laius. The guilt of a single man is implicitly denied. Yet Oedipus, having heard the plural reference (he will later hope for his innocence on the basis that he had understood that many men were said to have committed the crime), immediately replies: "How . . . should the robber have dared thus far?" (p. 372, stress mine), and continues: "For whoever was the slayer of Laius might wish to take vengeance on me also" (p. 373, stress mine), and later says again: "I charge you that no one of this land . . . give shelter or speak word unto that murderer, whosoever he may be . . ." (p. 375, stress mine). Oedipus persists in referring to a single murderer, until he is confronted with Teiresias, from whom he can expect the name of the guilty man. And now Oedipus reverts to the use of the plural and speaks of a riddance from the plague only "if we should learn aright the slayers of Laius, and slay them, or send them into exile from our land" (p. 377, stress mine).

This vacillation of Oedipus may be sheer inadvertence; but if he had ever wished for the Oracles' fulfillment, his present behavior can be seen in a new perspective, as slips of the tongue, representing the momentary breaking through of repressed ideas into overt expression. Had Oedipus wished to murder his father and had repressed such a wish, news of the murder of Laius, of a regicide exactly parallel to his own wish to commit regicide, might momentarily weaken his repression. The slip of a repressed idea into overt expression frequently occurs when the wish can be expressed with minimum distortion of external circumstances. The subject of regicide had already been raised and, necessarily, had to be discussed. When Creon initially mentioned a single guilty man, Oedipus had only to persist in referring to one man, in spite of Creon's later reference to the robbers who "met and fell on them, not in one man's might, but with full many hands." In this slip into the singular, Oedipus betrays his own guilty desires.

Oedipus refers to one guilty man many times, but then finally recovers his repression at precisely the moment at which he might be expected to do so, the moment when the need for repression was greatest, in colloquy with the dangerous Teiresias who might know or divine too much. The point to be emphasized here is that Oedipus need not have had at this moment any notion of his actual guilt in the slaying of Laius to have committed these slips of the tongue. All that is needful is that the actual regicide should have paralleled his previously repressed wish to commit such a crime.

4. Projected guilt.

The ensuing scene with Teiresias must also seem to be singularly inexplicable on any basis but that Oedipus is repressing knowledge of harboring parricidal and incestuous wishes. At first Oedipus greets Teiresias as a great prophet "whose soul grasps all things, the lore that may be told and the unspeakable, the secrets of heaven and the low things of earth" (p. 377). Teiresias at

first speaks obliquely, implying that Oedipus is responsible for the plague. Oedipus, although he has solved a subtle riddle once before, nevertheless fails to grasp that Teiresias, with each statement, is pointing an accusing finger at him. Each time Oedipus implores or upbraids Teiresias for withholding the information which Teiresias, in his own subtle way, is revealing.

Teiresias: Nay, I see that thou, on thy part, openest not thy lips in season: therefore I speak not, that neither may I have thy mishap. . . . Thou blamest my temper, but seest not that to which thou thyself art wedded: no, thou findest fault with me.

Oedipus: And who would not be angry to hear the words with which thou now dost slight this city? (pp. 377-78)

It need hardly be pointed out that Teiresias is not slighting the city; he is accusing Oedipus of being the guilty man. Oedipus is dissembling; he is displaying resistance to what is being unfolded, and this resistance will become increasingly pronounced as the evidence against him becomes ever more explicit; he will twist desperately from any association with parricide and incest.

Now Teiresias refuses to speak any further; Oedipus' reaction is again irrational, the response of a man repressing any thoughts of his own culpability. Oedipus suddenly accuses the blind prophet of having engineered the murder of Laius himself. Teiresias could not have profited by Laius' death, nor is it at all likely that, had he been responsible, he would confess knowledge and yet refuse to speak further. We can understand Oedipus' sudden and completely unsubstantiated accusation only if we infer that he had intuitively understood, even before the open naming of the murderer by Teiresias, that he must either discredit the prophet completely or stand accused of regicide himself. Oedipus simply cannot consider any possible guilt of his own in any connection, since his own dreadful, long-repressed wishes make him only too culpable to begin with.

An innocent man, not concealing feelings of guilt, would with greater logic attack the line of accusation itself, not strike out blindly at his accuser. The immediate discrediting of Teiresias is done, however, in order to obscure the subtle accusations that have been made. This is a defense Oedipus will turn on Creon and then, driven to desperation, on his own wife as well. As long as Oedipus projects his guilt he need not be conscious of it.

Teiresias, now taunted with the murder, specifically names Oedipus as the "accursed defiler" of the land. Now Oedipus waxes indignant:

Oedipus: Who taught thee this? It was not, at least, thine art.

Teiresias: Thou: for thou didst spur me into speech against my will.

Oedipus: What speech? Speak again that I may learn it better.

Teiresias: Didst thou not take my sense before? Or art thou tempting me to talk?

Oedipus: No, I took it not so that I can call it known: — speak again.

Teiresias: I say that thou art the slayer of the man whose slayer thou seekest.

Oedipus: Now thou shalt rue that thou hast twice said words so dire.

Teiresias: Wouldst thou have me say more, that thou mayst be more wroth?

Oedipus: What thou wilt; it will be said in vain. (p. 379)

Oedipus heard well the first time, and it is not like an innocent man, falsely accused, to pretend that he has not rightly heard his accusers. Oedipus' defiance to Teiresias to say "What thou wilt; it will be said in vain" must be seen as the purest resistance to the truth. Oedipus might very well pause for a moment to reflect that he had in fact slain a man of Laius' age, at about the time the murder was committed, and on the very road to Thebes. Instead Oedipus holds himself out as the possessor of the skill of the greatest seer, which is to say, a man to whom no one can bring the truth.

Accused of being a tricky quack, Teiresias replies that, regarding Oedipus' parentage, he is sane. It has been pointed out before in this paper that Oedipus has always had reason to question the identity of his parents, and inferences have been drawn from this fact. Oedipus now again reveals his doubts. He replies to Teiresias' vaguest of statements with the thoroughly revealing question: "What parents? Stay . . . and who of men is my sire?" (p. 381). Oedipus is momentarily caught off guard, his resistance again momentarily weakened by a reference to the very heart of his predicament. Teiresias has thrust at Oedipus an issue which will contribute to his undoing, the circumstances surrounding his flight from Corinth. It cannot be questioned that Oedipus' awareness of his former doubts, now long past, concerning his lineage, are again foremost in his mind as a result of the accusation of regicide, so that he gives them explicit expression even after the barest hint by Teiresias.

By this time Oedipus has resorted to accusing Creon, his old and trusted friend and brother-in-law, as the plotter against him in league with Teiresias. Such an accusation, while it is not impossible, is yet utterly unsubstantiated. It is the resort of a frightened man, a man horrified at what he is being constrained to face, who now screams at Teiresias: "Are these taunts to be indeed borne from him? — Hence, ruin take thee! Hence, this instant! Back! — away! — away! — away! — thee from these doors!" (p. 381). Turning on Creon, Oedipus exclaims: "Hast thou a front so bold that thou hast come to my house, who art the proved assassin of its master, — the palpable robber of my crown?" (p. 384). This is the most egregious slander. Nothing has been proved. Only the baldest surmise, the most tenuous of assumptions, can make both Teiresias and Creon, too, "palpably" guilty of both the murder of Laius, so many years ago, and now of an attempt to pin the crime unjustly on Oedipus and to usurp his crown. "Explain me not one thing — that thou art not false," Oedipus says to Creon, and then continues: "Learn thy fill; I shall never be found guilty of the blood." (pp. 384, 386). He will not consider the possibility of his own culpability, even as he had put off comprehending that an accusation was being made against him in the first place. Oedipus, like a paranoid, sees both the great seer and his trusted brother-in-law in league against him, plotting his destruction, and blatantly calls his accusation proven. Oedipus still does not take the natural and immediate recourse of an innocent man, a confident consideration of the events of Laius' murder and his own whereabouts at the time.

He counters Creon's assertion that he (Creon) has been content with his position in the kingdom, an assertion which the leader of the chorus finds credible, with the outrageous insistence that Creon be put to death. Unable to face his own aggressive and incestuous wishes and the influence they have had on his life, Oedipus still must project, however inappropriately, base and depraved motives on others. "I find thee not sane," Creon exclaims, not without reason, and Oedipus replies, with ironic accuracy, "Sane, at least, in mine own interest" (p. 387). Without a doubt, the accusations which Creon finds insane are Oedipus' very efforts to preserve his own sanity. If, as Creon points out, Oedipus may be doing violence to the truth, "Yet must I rule," Oedipus replies. Certainly he is wholly beyond justification for these words, that he must continue to rule, however false his po-

sition may be to others. Oedipus' guilt is becoming increasingly apparent, even as he states that he will never be found guilty.

5. An infinite number of questions.

Oedipus is at this moment a driven man, and pressures are soon to drive him to his last, most complete, and most evident flight from the truth. Jocasta now reveals to him that ministers of Phoebus — "I will not say from Phoebus himself" — had once prophesied that her child by Laius would one day murder his father, that to resist the prophecy they had abandoned their child to his death, that "contrary to that prophecy" Laius was murdered by robbers at a crossroads. Although it is true that Oedipus now chooses the less damning implication of Jocasta's words, ignoring the startling revelation that the prophecy concerning her child by Laius exactly matches his own prophecy received at Delphi, still for a brief moment Oedipus perceives that he may possibly be the murderer of her first husband.

Oedipus realizes that the three roads which met at the scene of the murder were the same as the locale of his own crime; the time of the two murders was the same; the appearance of Laius' travelling companions was identical with the many men whom Oedipus had slain with the elderly man; the one witness to Laius' murder had begged to leave the city when he found Oedipus ruling in the place of Laius. One detail alone differs: Laius was reported to have been slain by many men. Oedipus grasps at this one straw. It should be apparent to him by now how unsubstantial that straw is. That he suspends any conclusion regarding his own guilt until the witness has been searched out, despite the preponderant weight of the other evidence against him, cannot be seen as a search for the truth, but rather as the last desperate, unrealistic refusal to face his own regicidal guilt. Oedipus is not battling for the welfare of his city, nor is he catching at fresh evidence regarding the secrets of his past and of his identity; he is reaching frantically for the single detail at odds with the crushing array of evidence now against him. Oedipus is prepared, indeed eager, to doubt his own stabbing certainty of culpability; he is even prepared to doubt the veracity of the Delphic oracles, of the respected seer, of his trusted brother-in-law, and to stake all on the veracity of a single poor shepherd. Oedipus is like the patient in therapeutic analysis who, confronted with a well-documented analysis of an anxiety or fear, raises in his resistance to the analysis an infinite number of questions and calls for an endless process of continued documentation.

6. Resistance to no avail.

At this moment, waiting for the shepherd, final testimony is given as to the veracity of the Delphic oracles which Jocasta has proclaimed could never have been fulfilled. Oedipus is at this point brought face to face, if he would but look, with the one aspect of his predicament that he has most resolutely ignored: that his chosen course of action, the murder of an elderly man in the precincts of Thebes, and his marriage to the newly-widowed queen of that city, must now be seen to constitute parricidal and incestuous acts.

Oedipus learns of the natural death of Polybus and once again acts as though he had no doubt but that Polybus and Merope were his true parents. Yet we may recall that Oedipus' long-dormant doubts on this subject had just been quickened by Teiresias, as clearly evidenced by his reply, "What parents? Stay . . . and who of men is my sire?" As Oedipus had done at Delphi in his youth, so now he again represses his doubts. Instead his heart surges with cheer. He has now only to fear incest, since Polybus' death makes it impossible for him to be guilty of parricide.

He has now entirely dismissed the startling revelation that Jocasta's first child, born so many years before Oedipus' marriage to her, carried a predicted fate identical with his own. He cannot possibly unite the many facts now at his disposal: that he is

linked with that child, especially since he has suspected that Polybus and Merope were not his parents; that he has confessed a suspicion that he has murdered Jocasta's husband; that he has always been tormented by his predicted fate. He cannot use these facts to bring himself to suspect that his hidden parricidal and incestuous wishes have been entirely gratified. Instead he flies to the other extreme, and is now convinced that he can never be found guilty of such crimes.

Jocasta, who does not share the guilt of having murdered in response to parricidal wishes, a murder which there is now reason to suspect has made possible an incestuous marriage, will soon comprehend the complete truth at a time when Oedipus will still not have done with his questioning. Jocasta's reaction will be a foil to Oedipus', the appropriate response of an individual untroubled by the possession of such dreadful motivation.

They are both present as Oedipus learns that he is not the son of Polybus and Merope, but that he was rather found with his ankles bound, as Jocasta had bound the ankles of her own son, by a shepherd of the house of Laius. Jocasta is swift in her apprehension of the truth, which is for her fully incontrovertible. She exclaims in anguish: "Why ask of whom he spoke? Regard it not . . . waste not a thought on what he said . . . 'twere idle . . . For the gods' sake, if thou hast any care for thine own life, forbear this search! My anguish is enough . . . Ill-fated one! Mayest thou never come to know who thou art!" (p. 403).

At this moment, when Jocasta understands everything, Oedipus resorts to the most singular instance of resistance to the truth that we might discover in an otherwise sane individual. He construes Jocasta's horror as fear that he will be found to be base-born! What an ingenious device this reaction is; to now stand fearless in the face of the remotest of possibilities, that he is base-born, in order to ignore the truth which is now a certainty. Oedipus has become a theatrical magician who ostentatiously exhibits one innocent hand while the other covertly conceals the trick. He proclaims that he will not be dishonored by base birth — as though any one has accused him of it. He is "the son of Fortune that gives good." She is the "mother from whom he sprang," and he can never be false to her. Such dissembling is too transparent to be taken seriously. Oedipus' determination to disprove common lineage is no more than his continued flight from reality, a continued refusal to deal with what is now a foregone conclusion. His counselling that Jocasta be of good courage, that she will not be base-born even if he is found to be so, is simply his denial that she is his mother. Jocasta, of course, will have none of such futile posturing and exclaims: "Alas, alas, miserable! — that word alone can I say unto thee, and no other word henceforth for ever." (p. 403). That unspoken word, "son," is left to Oedipus' deaf ears as in despair she returns to her house and to her self-destruction.

Her son and husband still carries on as he has throughout, still acting out to the last possible moment his pretense of searching for knowledge. The shepherd is brought before him and we now witness a most curious scene. Oedipus seems suddenly bent at last on bringing the last piece of the puzzle into place. He will stop at nothing in order to coerce the shepherd into speaking; he even threatens him with death if he withholds information any longer. Oedipus would seem to be behaving entirely out of keeping with his former resistance. However, looking again beyond his alleged motives, his behavior may be understood in the light of analogous behavior of individuals in therapeutic treatment.

In such a situation the analyst patiently accumulates material relating to a particular diagnosis. This material is presented to the patient in such a manner that the diagnosis may be perceived by the patient in spite of his unconscious resistance to it. The diagnosis hangs in the air, needing only to be put expressly into words. The patient will later confess that his

mind was filled with the nature of the diagnosis but that he was unwilling to put it into words. This is the last shred of resistance left open to him. So long as the diagnosis has not actually been put into words, the patient is not committed to its acceptance. He lies silent on the couch thinking thoughts which, contrary to his agreement with his analyst that he will not withhold conscious thoughts, he will not express. In this case, where the patient's resistance is so strong, the analyst must voice the diagnosis notwithstanding the extent to which he has made it manifest to the patient. This is precisely the tactic, the last defense, however hopeless of success it may be, which Oedipus now resorts to.

Oedipus: Didst thou give this man [the Corinthian] the child...?

Herdsmen: I did, — and would that I had perished that day! ... It was a child... of the house of Laius.

Oedipus: A slave? or one born of his own race? ...

Herdsmen: ... 'twas said to be his own child — but thy lady within could best say how these things are.

Oedipus: How? She gave it to thee? ... For what end?

Herdsmen: That I should make away with it.

Oedipus: Her own child, the wretch?

Herdsmen: Aye, from fear of evil prophecies.

Oedipus: What were they?

Herdsmen: The tale ran that he must slay his sire.

Oedipus: Why, then, didst thou give him up to this old man?

Herdsmen: Through pity, master, as deeming that he would bear him away to another land, whence he himself came; but he saved him for the direst woe. For if thou art what this man saith, know that thou wast born to misery. (pp. 406-08)

Oedipus first clings to his preoccupation with servile birth; then, when the last piece of the puzzle is in place (" 'twas said to be his own child"), he concludes nothing; he asks for more details; he stalls for more time and expresses horror at Jocasta's action which, considering the prophecy concerning the child, was clearly understandable. When the shepherd explains that it was done "from fear of evil prophecies," Oedipus becomes pathetic in his resistance, demanding to know what the prophecies were and getting the answer he fully expects. Unable to break his line of now meaningless questions, he asks for the shepherd's motive in giving the child to the Corinthian. The shepherd's answer finally cuts away Oedipus' last refuge of defense, his mechanical repetition of questions to which he knows the answers.

Creon gives apt expression to Oedipus' final destiny, not that he is the victim of a predetermined misfortune, but rather, as Creon says: "Crave not to be master in all things: for the mastery which thou didst win hath not followed thee through life." (p. 416). The mastery which Oedipus sought, when he journeyed from Corinth in his youth, was not that of opposing his predicted fate, but of making it possible. In contrition, in possession of the conscious knowledge of what he has done, Oedipus must now expiate by losing everything. His fate has been, in short, his "Oedipal" complex.

Morton Kaplan
Columbia University
New York 27, N. Y.

THE FIVE FOOLS IN A TALE OF A TUB

Certainly psychology as a critical instrument needs no further apology or justification. But perhaps the emphasis on unconscious psychological motivation has been overstressed, to the unfortunate exclusion of its alternative; viz., the deliberate use, by an author, of erratic mental attitudes as a way of making a point. It may be that the psychological approach too often assumes that the critic is the analyst, whereas it may be the author who is the analyst. This is particularly true in the case of Jonathan Swift's Tale of a Tub, in which the author investigates various degrees of madness, and lets that investigation determine the structure and argument of the satire.

Very briefly, the five fools are Swift himself (the external fool, the Hamlet mad but north-north-west fool who knows only too well what he is about); the Socratic fool; the natural; the lunatic or monomaniac; and finally, the dangerous fool. There is a hierarchy here; one fool blends into another.

The first degree of foolishness, Swift's own excellent nonsense, has been admirably discussed. ^{1/} It will be enough here to point out that this external madness-with-a-method infiltrates into the first fool within the Tale, the Socratic fool who assumes a mask from behind which he can launch his satire. The first trace of this kind of fooling appears in the Dedication to Lord Somers; a neat bit of work which begins as rank naïveté ("Your lordship's name on the front in capital letters will at any time get off one edition" ^{2/}), progresses to comic destruction of the Grub-street ego (one hack after another deciding it is he who is meant in the words Detur Dignissimo) and concludes, leaving the impression that a considerable compliment has been paid (even by the hacks, Somers is named the second worthiest, after themselves). This is elemental irony; we see the comedian grinning behind every detail. It is the same sort of irony that we find in the tale of a tub proper, that is, in sections II, IV, VI, VIII, and XI. There is not much danger of losing sight of Swift's real intention in such passages as Peter's thundering anathema:

'Look ye, gentlemen,' cries Peter in a rage, 'to convince you what a couple of blind, positive, ignorant, wilful puppies you are, I will use but this plain argument; by G--, it is true, good, natural mutton as any in Leaden-hall market; and G-- confound you both eternally, if you offer to believe otherwise.' Such thundering proof as this left no further room for objection (p. 455).

Details like "the wise Aeolists affirm the gift of BELCHING to be the noblest act of a rational creature" (p. 481) and "'Worthy sir, do me the honour of a good slap in the chaps.' To another, 'Honest friend, pray favour me with a handsome kick on the arse'; 'Madam, shall I entreat a small box on the ear from your ladyship's fair hands?' 'Noble captain, lend a reasonable thwack, for the love of God, with that cane of yours over these poor shoulders'" (p. 515) define the Socratic fool: a speaker whose irony is metaphoric in the simplest sense, with the stated and implied

1/ Cf. Ricardo Quintana, The Mind and Art of Jonathan Swift (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1936) and Robert C. Elliott, "Swift's Tale of a Tub: An Essay in Problems of Structure," PMLA, 66 (1951), 441-55.

2/ Jonathan Swift, A Tale of a Tub, in Gulliver's Travels, A Tale of a Tub, The Battle of the Books, etc. London: Oxford University Press, 1954, p. 386. Since all references to the Tale are from this edition, page references will follow in the text rather than be footnoted.

terms never far apart. /3 Wotton's notes to the Tale are comic because they explain the obvious; the allegory and the irony within the allegory are transparent, the calculated statements of a cultivated ironist.

This ironist who realizes he is an ironist shades off into the natural fool; the fool of Plato's Ion or Phaedrus, Erasmus' Dame Folly, Lear's fool, or Yeats's Crazy Jane, an inspired fool who speaks more than he knows. The anguish in the Dedication to Prince Posterity over short-lived products of Grub-street, the definition of modern wit ("Some things are extremely witty today, or fasting, or in this place, or at eight o'clock, or over a bottle, or spoke by Mr. What'd'y'call'm, or in a summer's morning: any of which, by the smallest transposal or misapplication, is utterly annihilate", p. 400), the definition of the modern critic ("a discoverer and collector of writers' faults", p. 438), these and other such ambivalences are offered in good faith by the speaker. But we see an aspect which the fool has overlooked, and realize that in his foolishness he has spoken the truth. This natural unconsciously plants a mine under himself when he reports that "wisdom is a fox, who, after long hunting, will at last cost you the pains to dig out. 'Tis a cheese, which by how much the richer, has the thicker, the homelier, and the coarser coat; and whereof, to a judicious palate, the maggots are the best. 'Tis a sack-posset, wherein the deeper you go, you will find it the sweeter" (p. 417) and when he speaks of reason coming "officiously with tools for cutting, and opening, and mangling, and piercing." (p. 496). He asks us to examine, investigate, analyze; and as soon as we begin to do just that, we must jettison this fool and his philosophy:

I justly formed this conclusion to myself; that whatever philosopher or projector can find out an art to sodder and patch up the flaws and imperfections of nature, will deserve much better of mankind, and teach us a more useful science, than that so much in present esteem, of widening and exposing them (p. 497).

This is the fool, we recall, who had contemplated preparing A Panegyric upon the World and A modest Defence of the Rabble in all Ages, but had had to defer his project for he could find no material. Underneath the whirling surface of optimism, there lies a truth which this natural doesn't perceive.

The fourth degree of foolishness is one to which Swift returns with a vengeance in the third book of Gulliver's Travels and in A Modest Proposal; the monomaniac-turned-projector. This is a man who has no business setting up systems. He is a dilettante who has turned to authorship because of "a long prorogation of parliament, a great dearth of foreign news, and a tedious fit of rainy weather" (p. 391) and who plans to address himself "to all curious gentlemen" (p. 459) concerning "some particularly useless projects: a New Help of Smatterers, or the Art of being Deep-learned and Shallow-read; A Curious Invention about Mouse-traps; A Universal Rule of Reason, or Every Man his own Carver; together

- 3/ This seems to call for some explanation. All irony, as one of the assembling figures of speech, is metaphoric. Like metaphor, simile, symbol, and allegory, irony asks us to compare two ideas; irony is different from the allied figures in that the two ideas are at variance. The two conflicting ideas may be very close together (actual fanaticism and Swift's fanatic; or, to use an example outside Swift, George Orwell's "All men are equal, but some are more equal than others" and the inconsistency of totalitarian rule in a socialized state); or they may be widely separated (the humanitarian claims of A Modest Proposal vs. the actual savagery of the project). The shorter the distance between the two terms, it would seem, the more obvious the irony.

with a most useful engine for catching of owls" (p. 463). This man has no sense; in his mania for scientific projecting, he sees all things as material, and translates abstractions into material terms. So, for instance, his corruption of "weighty," "circle," and "light":

I confess: there is something yet more refined, in the contrivance and structure of our modern theatres. For, first, the pit is sunk below the stage, with due regard to the institution above deduced; that, whatever weighty matter shall be delivered thence (whether it be lead or gold) may fall plumb into the jaws of certain critics (as I think they are called) which stand ready open to devour them. Then, the boxes are built round, and raised to a level with the scene, in deference to the ladies; because, that large portion of wit, laid out in raising prurientes and protuberances, is observed to run much upon a line, and ever in a circle. The whining passions, and little starved conceits, are gently wafted up, by their own extreme levity, to the middle region, and there fix and are frozen by the frigid understandings of the inhabitants. Bombastry and buffoonery, by nature lofty and light, soar highest of all, and would be lost in the roof, if the prudent architect had not, with much foresight, contrived for them a fourth place, called the twelve-penny gallery, and there planted a suitable colony, who greedily intercept them in their passage (p. 413-14).

With such a bent toward material interpretation, it's no surprise to find this fool's mania expressing itself in figures: he would erect an Academy "capable of containing nine thousand seven hundred forty and three persons" (p. 349); he reverences a nostrum for universal intelligence which is "distilled seventeen times," kept sealed "for one-and-twenty days," then taken "three drops" at a time, and which will be effective "in fourteen minutes" (p. 461); he is composing

... a very profound mystery in the number of O's multiplied by seven and divided by nine. Also, if a devout brother of the Rosy Cross will pray fervently for sixty-three mornings, with a lively faith, and then transpose certain letters and syllables, according to prescription, in the second and fifth section, they will certainly reveal into a full receipt of the opus magnum. Lastly, whoever will be at pains to calculate the whole number of each letter in this treatise, and sum up the difference exactly between the several numbers, assigning the true natural cause for such difference, the discoveries in the product will plentifully reward his labour. (p. 507)

This lunatic easily becomes dangerous; as the modest proposer moves from his anti-ethical, anti-moral computations into the most fantastic of Malthusian cure-alls, so the fool of a Tale carries his material logic to its climax: let the Bedlamites handle the army, the courts, city business, the new science, for their material actions (violence, bluster, suspicion, misdirected curiosity) are so like the abstractions of these occupations, what's the difference between them? As this madman suggests that such a plan will be "for the universal benefit of human kind" (p. 502), we look ahead to another madman whose "fair, cheap and easy method of making these Children sound and useful Members of the Commonwealth, would deserve so well of the publick, as to have his Statue set up for a Preserver of the Nation." /4 The fool can go no further than this.

R. E. Hughes, Dept. of English
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Mass.

4/ Jonathan Swift, A Modest Proposal, in Satires and Personal Writings, ed. William Alfred Eddy. London: Oxford University Press, 1951, p. 21.

BOOK REVIEW

Leslie A. Fiedler — No! in Thunder: Essays on Myth and Literature. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960. Pp. xli + 336 (including Index). \$5.00.

Leslie Fiedler tells us that he views his "essays on myth and literature" in the following way:

I have undercut nothing on which I do not stand or do not remember having been tempted to stand. My book is, therefore, even where it seems least so, an autobiography, a confession: the continuing record of my sentimental education, as well as an account of the world in which I am being educated. (Stress mine.)

These sentences are revealing. Why "undercut"? Fiedler attacks the authoritarian Other: he refuses to submit to the Grove of Academe, the Book-of-the-Month Club, and, at times, his "civilized" self. The word "stand" suggests a concrete solidity more forceful than abstract and often lazy Belief. The rebel — especially the Romantic rebel — is always tempted to worship the Other, to say Yes and gain peace. Fiedler's literary criticism is confessional; it is a vessel into which he pours his deep concerns — a heroic, outrageous act in our age of cold explication. These essays tell us about his parents, his jobs, his friends and enemies. Fiedler's strategy is clear: he does not divorce intellect from passion; he uses the personal voice.

But the disinterested reader may ask: What has this strategy to do with essays on myth and literature? There are two answers. The simple one is that Fiedler discusses artists close to his concerns: Whitman deals with the "positive" negation of the commonplace; Kafka, the "humorous, hectic, fragmentary" Jew is another; so is James Baldwin. It is exciting to watch Fiedler pursue his gothic doubles, but the excitement becomes intense when he confronts Shakespeare, Dante, and R. L. S. — for the first time we experience their struggles to resolve the dualities of freedom and necessity, male and female, love and death, head and heart, No and Yes. Underlying the dramatic encounters with these artists is an ordered, "marvelous" madness which tries to make us see the "inexhaustible source" of literature — mythos.

The resolution of dualities (in life and especially in art) lies in the fusion of "archetype" and "signature." This is the second reason for Fiedler's strategy: his strategy is at one with his theory — his signature is evident when he discusses other artists (even those very close to him); at the same time archetypes recur in each discussion. Fiedler is Fiedler; Whitman is Whitman; both embody the values of Faust, Oedipus, and Adam.

Fiedler is more than a frustrated Talmudist or psychoanalyst: he is one of the "happy few" who urge us to connect conscious and unconscious, art and artist, signature and archetype, knowing the impossible difficulty of the task: "The image of man in art, however magnificently portrayed — indeed, precisely when it is most magnificently portrayed — is the image of a failure. There is no way out." No way out but in mythic thunder!

Irving Malin
Department of English
The City College
New York 31, N. Y.

OTHER BOOKS RECEIVED

Herbert A. Bloch, ed. — Crime in America: Controversial Issues in Twentieth Century Criminology. New York: Phil. Library, 1961. Pp. 355 (including Name Index). \$6.00

George Eliot — Daniel Deronda (Introduction by F. R. Leavis). New York: Harper (Torchbook paperback TB 1039), 1961. Pp. xxiii+612. \$2.25.

The Introduction was first published in the October 1960 issue of Commentary under the title "George Eliot's Zionist Novel."

Charles S. Felver — Robert Armin, Shakespeare's Fool: A Biographical Essay. Kent State University Bulletin: Research Series No. V. Pp. 82 (pamphlet). \$1.00.

Morris Golden — In Search of Stability: The Poetry of William Cowper. New York: Bookman Associates, 1960. Pp. 189 (including Notes, Bibliography, and Index). \$4.50.

Your Editor is saving this study for future comment, but he would yield to someone with greater competence in the field. In any event, this is a literary study based on systematic psychological investigations and should receive a full review in our pages in a later issue.

William James — Psychology: The Briefer Course (abridged, edited, and with an Introduction by Gordon Allport). New York: Harper (Torchbook TB 1034), 1961. Pp. xxiii+343 (including Index). \$1.85.

"...James," writes Professor Allport in his Introduction, "was a compassionate realist. His view of the human predicament is as stark as that of a Kafka or Camus.... While many modern existentialists see no escape from the anguish in life, James, though acknowledging its gravity, would certainly point to the hopeful and redemptive capacities resident in most men, to their reservoir of courage, and to their freedom to find sustaining, and therefore true, beliefs." (Pp. xxii-xxiii.)

Toby Lelyveld — Shylock on the Stage. Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1960. Pp. 149 (including Bibliography and Index). \$4.95.

Irving Malin — William Faulkner: An Interpretation. Stanford University Press, 1957. Pp. viii+99 (no Index).

The "interpretation" is frequently in psychodynamic terms. Chapter 6 is entitled "Faulkner and Two Psychoanalysts [Freud and Jung]." We once commented (VII, 4, 59) on Professor Beebe's objections to Dr. Malin's study in the name of the bugaboo of "deterministic criticism." We cannot, now as then, see any danger in Dr. Malin's approach, *per se*. A work such as his will have to be evaluated as criticism, not by a mere reference to the critic's use of an allegedly "non-literary discipline" as an aid in his interpretation. Faulkner, for one, has not objected.

Joseph S. Roucek, ed. — Sociology of Crime. New York: Phil. Library, 1961. Pp. 551 (including Index). \$10.00

Jean Starobinski — L'Oeil vivant. Paris: Gallimard, 1961. Pp. 262 (including Notes, no index). 9.50 NF.

Essays on Corneille, Racine, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Stendhal. In the second of these M. Starobinski cites in a note Charles Mauron's L'Inconscient dans la vie et l'oeuvre de Racine, Aix-en-Provence. 1957.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (XXXIX)

* * A Special Request

Our readers may remember Norman Kiell's The Adolescent Through Fiction, which was the subject of comment in IX, 2, 24, and of an extended review in IX, 3 & 4, 55-56. One of the most interesting

features of that book was its inclusion of a bibliographical appendix listing works on the interrelationship of literature and psychology. Dr. Kiell has now determined to go ahead with the herculean task of extending that bibliography, and in the following communication he asks for the help of our readers:

I am preparing a bibliography, tentatively titled **PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, PSYCHOLOGY AND LITERATURE: AN INDEX**. All items to be included will have distinct relevancy and basis in psychoanalytic and psychological theories, without distinction as to particular schools or philosophies.

It is intended to include the following categories as they relate to literature:

- | | |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Myths | 11. Diaries |
| 2. Biblical tales and figures | 12. Wit and humor |
| 3. Fables and folklore | 13. Literary criticism |
| 4. Fairy tales | 14. Movies |
| 5. Superstition | 15. Radio |
| 6. Fiction | 16. Television |
| 7. Drama | 17. Comics |
| 8. Poetry | 18. Journalism |
| 9. Autobiography and biography | 19. Propaganda |
| 10. Letters | 20. Miscellaneous |

Each category will be listed alphabetically by author. The second section of the book will contain a subject matter cross-index. Items dating from 1900 to the present will be included.

Will readers who would like to have any works included in this bibliography kindly communicate with Prof. Norman Kiell, Department of Personnel Service, Brooklyn College, Bedford Avenue and Avenue H, Brooklyn 10, New York. Give bibliographic data and a phrase or two to describe the nature of the work. Do NOT include anything that has been published in **LITERATURE AND PSYCHOLOGY**; an index of past issues will be issued shortly.

Our blessings — and commiserations — to Dr. Kiell!

Offprints received from the authors:

& - John Chynoweth Burnham, "Psychiatry, Psychology and the Progressive Movement," Amer Qtrly, XII, 4 (Win 1960), 457-65.
 & - -----, ed., "Sigmund Freud and G. Stanley Hall: Exchange of Letters," Psa Qtrly, XXIX (1960), 307-16.

% - Carvel Collins, "Miss Quentin's Paternity Again," Univ of Texas Stud in Lit & Lang, II, 3 (Aut 1960), 253-60.

* - William H. Desmonde, "The Ritual Origin of Plato's Dialogues: A Study of Argumentation and Conversation among Intellectuals," Amer Imago, 17, 4 (Win 1960), 389-406.

* - Leonard F. Manheim, "Thanatos: The Death Instinct in Dickens' Later Novels," Psa & Psa Rev, 47, 4 (Win 1960-61), 17-31. [Subscribers who wish copies of this offprint may obtain them by sending a stamped, self-addressed envelope to the author.]

% - Mordecai Marcus, "What is an Initiation Story?" JAAC, XIX, 2 (Win 1960), 221-28.

& - Léon Ostrov (Professor of Depth Psychology at the University of Buenos Aires), "Sobre algunos aspectos específicos de las relaciones entre analistas," Revista de Psicoanálisis, XVI (Oct-Dec 1959), 432-37. [Summary in English at p. 437.]

* - -----, "Marcel Proust y el psicoanálisis," La Nacion (Buenos Aires), 10 April 1960, Section 3, p. 1.

* - Paul Rom, "The Notion of Solidarity in the Work of Albert Camus," Jrnl Ind Psy, 16 (Nov 1960), 146-50.

From a list of the writings of Martin Kallich (commentator at the 1958 meeting of G. T. 10 [IX, 1, 4-5]):

* - The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory in Eighteenth Century England. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation at Johns Hopkins University, 1945).

* - "The Association of Ideas and Critical Theory: Hobbes, Locke, and Addison," ELH, XII (Dec 1945), 240-315.

* - "The Associationist Criticism of Francis Hutcheson and David Hume," SP, XLIII (Oct 1946), 644-67.

* - "The Association of Ideas and Akenside's Pleasures of Imagination," MLN, LXII (Mar 1947), 166-73.

? - "The Meaning of Archibald Alison's Essay on Taste," PQ XXVII (Oct 1948), 314-24.

* - "The Associationist Psychology in Samuel Johnson's Criticism," MLN, LXIX (Mar 1954), 17-76.

& - "The Argument against the Association of Ideas in Eighteenth Century Aesthetics," MLQ, XV (June 1954), 125-36.

Dr. Harry Bergholz quite accurately points out that there has not been much reference in the Lit & Psy bibliographies to "an unusually good German periodical founded in 1947 [which has published] quite a number of articles [which] deal with psychological and psychoanalytic subjects." From the marked publisher's prospectus which Dr. Bergholz has sent us we note the following from

Studium Generale: Zeitschrift für die Einheit der Wissenschaften im Zusammenhang ihrer Begriffsbildungen und Forschungsmethoden:

& - E. Kretschmer — Die Psychoanalyse im Gang der psychotherapeutischen Gesamtentwicklung, 2. Jahrgang (1949), 2. Heft.

& - V. E. Frhr. v. Gebattel — Die Person und die Grenzen des tiefenpsychologischen Verfahrens, 3 (1950), 6.

& - J. Meinertz — Die spezifische Art der Erfassung tiefenpsychologischer Zusammenhänge, Ibid.

& - E. Michel — Zur anthropologischen Deutung der Hysterie. Ein Beitrag zur Neurosenlehre, Ibid.

& - M. Boss — Die neuesten Fortschritte auf dem Gebiete der Psychoanalyse, Ibid.

& - H. Kunz — Zur wissenschaftstheoretischen Problematik der Psychoanalyse, Ibid.

& - H. Schultz-Hencke — Neo-psychoanalyse, Ibid.

& - H. Kuhn — Dichtungswissenschaft und Soziologie, 3, 11.

& - K. Strunz — Zur Methodologie der psychologischen Typenforschung, 4 (1951), 7.

% - G. W. Mühle & A. Wellek — Ausdruck, Darstellung, Gestaltung, 5 (1952), 2.

& - H. Thomae — Die biographische Methode in den anthropologischen Wissenschaften, 5, 3.

& - J. H. Schultz, reply to the Thomae article, supra; replication by Thomae, 5, 7.

& - W. Metzger — Das Bild des Menschen in der neueren Psychologie, 5, 9.

* - J. Bahle — Psychologische Maßstäbe zur Beurteilung zeitgenössischer Künstler, Ibid.

& - I. A. Caruso — Das Symbol in der Tiefenpsychologie, 6 (1953), 5.

* - H. S. Reiss — Bild und Symbol in 'Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahren', 6, 6.